Varia - Tag - SEP

Du mensonge et de la tromperie

Mickaël Simon — Sat, 23 Feb 2008 12:44:00 +0100

Questions central to the philosophical discussion of lying to others and other-deception (or interpersonal deceiving) may be divided into two kinds. Questions of the first kind are definitional. They include the questions of how lying is to be defined, and how deceiving is to be defined, and whether lying is a form of intended deception. Questions of the second kind are moral. They include the questions of whether lying and deceiving are (defeasibly) morally wrong, and whether, if either lying or deception, or both, are defeasibly morally wrong, they are ever morally obligatory, and not just merely morally permissible. In this entry, we only consider questions of the first kind.

The Definition of Lying and Deception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Nominalisme

Mickaël Simon — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 23:58:00 +0100

Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals. Philosophers have often found it necessary to postulate either abstract objects or universals. And so Nominalism in one form or another has played a significant role in the metaphysical debate since at least the Middle Ages, when versions of the second variety of Nominalism were introduced. The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other. However both varieties share some common motivations and arguments. This entry surveys nominalistic theories of both varieties.

Nominalism in Metaphysics

Logique du second ordre et d'ordre supérieur

Mickaël Simon — Thu, 20 Dec 2007 12:28:00 +0100

There are two approaches to the semantics of second-order logic. They differ on the interpretation of the phrase “for every set of objects.” Does this have some fixed meaning to which we can refer, or do we need to consider the variety of meanings the phrase might have? In the first case (which will be called standard semantics), we are taking for granted certain mathematical concepts. In the second case (which will be called general semantics), much less is being taken for granted. In this case, to be considered valid, a sentence will need to be true under all the allowable meanings of the phrase “for every set of objects.”

Second-order and Higher-order Logic

Éthique déontologique

Mickaël Simon — Thu, 22 Nov 2007 22:39:00 +0100

In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to (aretaic (virtue) theories) that — fundamentally, at least — guide and assess what kind of person (in terms of character traits) we are and should be.

Deontological Ethics

La définition de l'art

Mickaël Simon — Tue, 23 Oct 2007 23:27:00 +0200

Contemporary definitions are of two main sorts. One distinctively modern, conventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art's institutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time, modern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art, and the relational properties of artworks that depend on works' relations to art history, art genres, etc. The less conventionalist sort of contemporary definition makes use of a broader, more traditional concept of aesthetic properties that includes more than art-relational ones, and focuses on art's pan-cultural and trans-historical characteristics.

Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

La philosophie des mathématiques

Mickaël Simon — Wed, 26 Sep 2007 19:43:00 +0200

If mathematics is regarded as a science, then the philosophy of mathematics can be regarded as a branch of the philosophy of science, next to disciplines such as the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology. However, because of its subject matter, the philosophy of mathematics occupies a special place in the philosophy of science. Whereas the natural sciences investigate entities that are located in space in time, it is not at all obvious that this also the case of the objects that are studied in mathematics. In addition to that, the methods of investigation of mathematics differ markedly from the methods of investigation in the natural sciences. Whereas the latter acquire general knowledge using inductive methods, mathematical knowledge appears to be acquired in a different way, namely, by deduction from basic principles.

Leon Horsten, Philosophy of Mathematics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

La logique de Bolzano

Mickaël Simon — Sun, 23 Sep 2007 09:26:00 +0200

Bolzano's presentation of logic is embedded in the vast body of the Theory of Science (henceforth TS). His logic is based on the abstract concepts of proposition in itself (an sich) and idea in itself, which are both independent of thought and language. His logic of ideas contains a new treatment of their content and extension and, among other things, yields an analysis of ideas without objects. A purely logical definition of intuitions as simple singular ideas allowed Bolzano to distinguish them from concepts and to complete the traditional epistemological distinction between a priori and a posteriori by the logical distinction between conceptual and empirical propositions (and sciences).

Jan Sebestik, Bolzano's Logic, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Métaphysique

Mickaël Simon — Wed, 12 Sep 2007 23:10:00 +0200

It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the science that studied being as such or the first causes of things or things that do not change. It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging things—would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical.

Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Anti-réalisme moral

Mickaël Simon — Tue, 31 Jul 2007 21:23:00 +0200

Traditionnellement, soutenir une position réaliste à propos de X, c'est soutenir que X existe de manière indépendante de l'esprit. De ce point de vue, l'anti-réalisme moral est le rejet de la thèse selon laquelle les propriétés morales - ou les faits, les objets, les relations, les événements, etc. (quelques que soient les catégories que vous êtes disposés à accepter) - existent indépendamment de l'esprit. Ceci peut impliquer soit (1) qu'il n'existe pas de propriétés morales, soit (2) qu'il en existe, mais que cette existence est (dans le sens en question) dépendante de l'esprit. Si nous laissons de côtés certaines difficultés que nous discuterons plus bas, il y a deux manières de soutenir (1) : le non-cognitivisme morale et la théorie morale de l'erreur. Nous pouvons considérer les partisans de (2) comme des subjectivistes moraux, des idéalistes ou des constructivistes. Employer de telles étiquettes reste imprécis et controversable : elles sont juste utilisées ici pour nous situer grossièrement. En gardant cette imprécision à l'esprit, nous pouvons caractériser ces positions comme suit :

Moral Anti-Realism

Le sens de la vie

Mickaël Simon — Wed, 16 May 2007 19:46:00 +0000

Quand le thème du sens de la vie est soulevé, les gens posent souvent l'une de ces deux questions : « Quel est le sens de la vie ? » et « De quoi parlez-vous ? ». La littérature à ce sujet peut être divisée en fonction des tentatives de réponses apportées à ces deux questions. Dans l'étude qui va suivre, nous examinerons les travaux qui discutent la seconde question, la plus abstraite, celle qui concerne le sens à parler de la « signification de la vie, », c'est-à-dire qui visent à clarifier ce que nous demandons quand nous posons la question de ce qui, si il y a quelque chose, rend la vie significative.

The meaning of life

La suite examine la thèse supernaturaliste, la thèse naturaliste et la thèse nihiliste.