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23 février 2008

Du mensonge et de la tromperie

Questions central to the philosophical discussion of lying to others and other-deception (or interpersonal deceiving) may be divided into two kinds. Questions of the first kind are definitional. They include the questions of how lying is to be defined, and how deceiving is to be defined, and whether lying is a form of intended deception. Questions of the second kind are moral. They include the questions of whether lying and deceiving are (defeasibly) morally wrong, and whether, if either lying or deception, or both, are defeasibly morally wrong, they are ever morally obligatory, and not just merely morally permissible. In this entry, we only consider questions of the first kind.

The Definition of Lying and Deception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

13 février 2008

Nominalisme

Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals. Philosophers have often found it necessary to postulate either abstract objects or universals. And so Nominalism in one form or another has played a significant role in the metaphysical debate since at least the Middle Ages, when versions of the second variety of Nominalism were introduced. The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other. However both varieties share some common motivations and arguments. This entry surveys nominalistic theories of both varieties.

Nominalism in Metaphysics

20 décembre 2007

Logique du second ordre et d'ordre supérieur

There are two approaches to the semantics of second-order logic. They differ on the interpretation of the phrase “for every set of objects.” Does this have some fixed meaning to which we can refer, or do we need to consider the variety of meanings the phrase might have? In the first case (which will be called standard semantics), we are taking for granted certain mathematical concepts. In the second case (which will be called general semantics), much less is being taken for granted. In this case, to be considered valid, a sentence will need to be true under all the allowable meanings of the phrase “for every set of objects.”

Second-order and Higher-order Logic

22 novembre 2007

Éthique déontologique

In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to (aretaic virtue theories) that — fundamentally, at least — guide and assess what kind of person (in terms of character traits) we are and should be.

Deontological Ethics

23 octobre 2007

La définition de l'art

Contemporary definitions are of two main sorts. One distinctively modern, conventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art's institutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time, modern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art, and the relational properties of artworks that depend on works' relations to art history, art genres, etc. The less conventionalist sort of contemporary definition makes use of a broader, more traditional concept of aesthetic properties that includes more than art-relational ones, and focuses on art's pan-cultural and trans-historical characteristics.

Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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