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Tag - SEP
23 avril 2008
L'éthique des affaires
« Business ethics is the applied ethics discipline that addresses the moral features of commercial activity. In practice, however, a dizzying array of projects is pursued under its rubric. Programs of legal compliance, empirical studies into the moral beliefs and attitudes of business people, a panoply of best-practices claims (in the name of their moral merit or their contribution to business success), arguments for (or against) mandatory worker participation in management, and attempts at applying traditional ethical theories, theories of justice, or theories of the state to firms or to the functional areas of business are all advanced as contributions to business ethics—even and especially in its academic literature. These projects vary considerably and often seem to have little in common other than the conviction, held by those who pursue them, that whatever each is pursuing is business ethics.
This entry focuses generally on academic business ethics, more particularly on the philosophically-informed part of business ethics, and most particularly on the constellation of philosophically-relevant questions that inform the main conversation and ongoing disagreement among academic business ethicists. It covers: (1) the history of business ethics as an academic endeavor; (2) the focus on the corporation in academic business ethics; (3) the treatment of the employment relation in academic business ethics; (4) the treatment of transnational issues in academic business ethics; and (5) criticism of the focus and implicit methodology of academic business ethics. »
23 février 2008
Du mensonge et de la tromperie
Questions central to the philosophical discussion of lying to others and other-deception (or interpersonal deceiving) may be divided into two kinds. Questions of the first kind are definitional. They include the questions of how lying is to be defined, and how deceiving is to be defined, and whether lying is a form of intended deception. Questions of the second kind are moral. They include the questions of whether lying and deceiving are (defeasibly) morally wrong, and whether, if either lying or deception, or both, are defeasibly morally wrong, they are ever morally obligatory, and not just merely morally permissible. In this entry, we only consider questions of the first kind.The Definition of Lying and Deception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
13 février 2008
Nominalisme
Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals. Philosophers have often found it necessary to postulate either abstract objects or universals. And so Nominalism in one form or another has played a significant role in the metaphysical debate since at least the Middle Ages, when versions of the second variety of Nominalism were introduced. The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other. However both varieties share some common motivations and arguments. This entry surveys nominalistic theories of both varieties.
20 décembre 2007
Logique du second ordre et d'ordre supérieur
There are two approaches to the semantics of second-order logic. They differ on the interpretation of the phrase “for every set of objects.” Does this have some fixed meaning to which we can refer, or do we need to consider the variety of meanings the phrase might have? In the first case (which will be called standard semantics), we are taking for granted certain mathematical concepts. In the second case (which will be called general semantics), much less is being taken for granted. In this case, to be considered valid, a sentence will need to be true under all the allowable meanings of the phrase “for every set of objects.”
22 novembre 2007
Éthique déontologique
In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to (aretaic (virtue) theories) that — fundamentally, at least — guide and assess what kind of person (in terms of character traits) we are and should be.
23 octobre 2007
La définition de l'art
Contemporary definitions are of two main sorts. One distinctively modern, conventionalist, sort of definition focuses on art's institutional features, emphasizing the way art changes over time, modern works that appear to break radically with all traditional art, and the relational properties of artworks that depend on works' relations to art history, art genres, etc. The less conventionalist sort of contemporary definition makes use of a broader, more traditional concept of aesthetic properties that includes more than art-relational ones, and focuses on art's pan-cultural and trans-historical characteristics.Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
26 septembre 2007
La philosophie des mathématiques
If mathematics is regarded as a science, then the philosophy of mathematics can be regarded as a branch of the philosophy of science, next to disciplines such as the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology. However, because of its subject matter, the philosophy of mathematics occupies a special place in the philosophy of science. Whereas the natural sciences investigate entities that are located in space in time, it is not at all obvious that this also the case of the objects that are studied in mathematics. In addition to that, the methods of investigation of mathematics differ markedly from the methods of investigation in the natural sciences. Whereas the latter acquire general knowledge using inductive methods, mathematical knowledge appears to be acquired in a different way, namely, by deduction from basic principles.Leon Horsten, Philosophy of Mathematics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
23 septembre 2007
La logique de Bolzano
Bolzano's presentation of logic is embedded in the vast body of the Theory of Science (henceforth TS). His logic is based on the abstract concepts of proposition in itself (an sich) and idea in itself, which are both independent of thought and language. His logic of ideas contains a new treatment of their content and extension and, among other things, yields an analysis of ideas without objects. A purely logical definition of intuitions as simple singular ideas allowed Bolzano to distinguish them from concepts and to complete the traditional epistemological distinction between a priori and a posteriori by the logical distinction between conceptual and empirical propositions (and sciences).Jan Sebestik, Bolzano's Logic, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
12 septembre 2007
Métaphysique
It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the science that studied being as such or the first causes of things or things that do not change. It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging things—would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical.Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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