Why do people act in the way that they do? Sometimes, in asking a such question, we are inquiring into people’s motives for acting in certain ways. At other times we are seeking to uncover their reasons for acting. And yet others we want to know the causes of their actions. Not all philosophers of action would agree that the notions of motive, reason and cause are perfectly distinct, but some of our ordinary ways of talking suggest that they are. Suppose, for instance, that a youth has been brought before a juvenile court accused of some act of vandalism, such as breaking all the windows in his school. Asked for his reasons for behaving in this way, the youth might trply that he had no reason - that he dit it just because he felt like doing it when the opportunity arose. In particular, he may deny that he did it with premeditation. And, indeed, we might agree that the action was a thoroughly irrational and senseless one. On the other hand, a psychologist might consider that the youth had strong motives for acting in this way - for instance, that he dit it out of feelings of frustation, bitterness or jealousy. Yet again, a social worker might try to explain the youth’s behaviour as being caused by his poor home background and ill-treatment in infancy

E. J. Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, p. 257, Cambride University Press, 2000.